CONFIDENTIAL 25X1m(1) Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP82-00457R008600300001 STOWER/CONTROL CLASSIFICATION REPORT NO. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT CD NO. China DATE DISTR. 12 Sept. 1951 COUNTRY NO. OF PAGES Chinese Communist and Soviet Views of Signing SUBJECT of Peace Treaty 25X1C NO. OF ENCLS. PLACE **ACQUIRED** SUPPLEMENT TO DATE OF 25 INFO. REPORT NO. CI HR 70-2 22/26/2012 identical despite apparent disparity in their actions: the Soviets Date: hope to launch a peace offensive in San Francisco to frustrate the signing of the treaty; the Chinese believe they are helpless to frustrate the signing of the treaty except through fighting. Eighty percent of the Chinese Communist political workers believe that in military matters the Soviets lead the Chinese, while in political matters the Chinese lead On 10 August the Chinese sounded Soviet opinion by saying, "If the peace treaty can only be frustrated by world war, the Kaesong talks should be abandoned and full scale fighting resumed. If we wish to avoid war we must agree to a cease-fire." On 16 August the Soviets sent urgent word to the Chinese, telling them to create further incidents so as to break off the Kaesong talks, then await further instructions. On the night of 19 August the Moscow broadcast on the abrogation of the Soviet-American commercial agreement, saying it was an act to aggravate the situation, indicated the approaching showdown. Two Kaesong incidents occurred immediately afterwards. A directive of the Chinese Politburo states that if a decisive war is to be fought, it should start in Korea on 8 September, and that the decisive 25X1A war in Korea is the Chinese answer to the peace treaty. 25X1C Comment. for reports on Chinese and Soviet intentions with respect to the San Francisco Peace Conference. CONFIDENTIAL 25X1A